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ABSTRACT
This work tackles the Pixel Privacy task put forth by MediaEval
2019. Our goal is to manipulate images in a way that conceals them
from automatic scene classifiers while preserving the original image
quality. We use the fast gradient sign method, which normally has
a corrupting influence on image appeal, and devise two methods
to minimize the damage. The first approach uses a map of pixel
locations that are either salient or flat, and directs perturbations
away from them. The second approach subtracts the gradient of an
aesthetics evaluation model from the gradient of the attack model
to guide the perturbations towards a direction that preserves appeal.
We make our code available at: https://git.io/JesXr.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Pixel Privacy task, introduced by MediaEval [7], aims at devel-
oping methods for manipulating images in a way that fools auto-
matic scene classifiers (referred to as attack models). As an added
constraint, the images should not exhibit a decrease in aesthetic
quality. The organizers made available the Places365-Standard data
set [11] along with a pre-trained ResNet [3] attack model for the
task.
The contribution of image enhancement techniques in privacy
protection has been previously explored [1], showing that even
popular filters used in social media have a cloaking effect against
geo-location algorithms. A more recent work by Liu et al. [6] pro-
posed a perturbation-based approach (white-box) and a transfer
style approach (black-box). Similar to the first module in that work,
we propose two perturbation-based approaches and explore ways to
localize the perturbations in a manner that does not reduce appeal.
2 APPROACH
We developed two approaches, both of which utilize FGSM [2].
FGSM uses the gradient of the attack model and changes the pixel
values by nudging them towards the direction that maximizes the
loss. Furthermore, the strength of these perturbations varies and is
represented by the ϵ value.
2.1 Salient Defence
Our first approach combines two maps: one is a measure of saliency
and the other a measure of flatness. Salient areas are the ones that
are more likely to attract the eye of an observer, and are predicted
by a DNN. In particular, we use SalBCE [5] trained on the SALICON
dataset [4]. Furthermore, perturbations become more obvious when
they are located in flat areas. For this reason, we also used a Sobel
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(a) Original Image (b) Sobel Map
(c) Reverse Saliency Map (d) Final Map
Figure 1: Maps used to constrain perturbations on less ob-
vious areas. The reverse saliency map along with the Sobel
map produce the final map.
filter [9], which detects areas where edges are more prevalent.
Gaussian blurring (σ=10) is applied to spread the detected edges,
forming the final Sobel map. The saliency map is reversed so that
the pixels corresponding to salient areas are zeroed out. Then,
pixels where the mean value is below average on the Sobel map
(hence more likely to be on a flat area) are also zeroed out. The
resulting mapM, the sign of the network’s gradient g, and the value
ϵ are multiplied and added to the original image I, completing the
modification. Figure 1 illustrates an example of map generation.
Imodified = M ◦ sдn(д(I )) ◦ ϵ + I (1)
Additionally, we used a popular filter for image manipulation,
namely tilt-shift to inspect how it affects the efficacy of our ap-
proach. Tilt-shift essentially blurs parts of the background while
intensifying foreground. In our case we used the saliency maps as
an estimate of the foreground to be intensified, blurring the rest.
2.2 Coupled Optimization
The second approach exploits the gradients of both the attack model
and the aesthetics evaluation algorithm. The aesthetics evaluation
in our case is the NIMA algorithm [10]. Since the networks differ
significantly, the gradients are first scaled to be brought to the
same range [0,1]. Afterwards, NIMA’s gradient is subtracted from
ResNet’s and as a result we get the sign of the total gradient and
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Figure 2: Attack model accuracy under differing values of ϵ .
multiply that by ϵ :
Imodified = sдn(дResNet (I ) − дNIMA(I )) ◦ ϵ + I (2)
3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In our initial experiments, we used the full-resolution images from
Places365 and applied a variety of ϵ values to investigate how they
affect the accuracy of the attack model (Figure 2). Salient Defence
perturbs less pixels, which explains the lower impact on accuracy
compared to the vanilla FGSM. We also note that the tilt-shift filter
further reduces the efficacy of those perturbations. The coupled
optimization approach, has a higher impact on the accuracy of the
attack model, as it manipulates all the pixels of the image.
The test set, as evaluated by the MediaEval team (Table 1) was
first downsampled to 256 × 256 and the algorithms were applied
afterwards. Note that this set includes only images that ResNet
predicts successfully, and so the initial accuracy (ϵ = 0) is 100%.
In that case it seems that the tilt-shift effect actually adds to the
efficacy of the perturbations, bringing the accuracy of the attack
model down while increasing the aesthetics score.
To test NIMA’s sensitivity to perturbations, we used FGSM
(vanilla) with a very high ϵ = 0.15 on a small subset (100) of the
validation images. This type of attack effectively ruins the visual
appeal; however, the NIMA score drops by only a small amount
(from 4.26 to 3.98). This indicates that NIMA has a low-sensitivity to
adversarial perturbations. This could be explained by the fact that
NIMAwas trained on AVA [8], a dataset collected by photographers.
The model is, therefore, sensitive to high-level concepts of aesthetic
appeal, such as the rule of thirds, but has not been trained to be
sensitive to the low-level corrupting influence of perturbations.
(a) Vanilla FGSM, ϵ = 0.05 (b) Salient Defence, ϵ = 0.05
(c) Salient Defence & tshift, ϵ =
0.01
(d) Coupled Optimization, ϵ =
0.05
Figure 3: The most promising configurations contrasted
with the vanilla FGSM.
Methods ϵ Top-1 Acc.↓ NIMA Score↑
Salient Defence 0.01 0.937 4.630.05 0.735 4.58
Salient Defence & tilt-shift 0.01 0.868 4.75
Coupled Optimization 0.01 0.917 4.630.05 0.458 4.54
Original Test Set - 1.0 4.64
Table 1: Results on MediaEval test set. Top-1 accuracy refers
to the the prediction accuracy of the attackmodel (ResNet50
trained on Places365-standard data set). The NIMA Score col-
umn represents the average of the aesthetics scores.
4 DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
An obvious shortcoming of our salient defence algorithm is that
saliency is subject to change after manipulations to the image.
One way of improving this would be to predict the saliency of the
perturbed image and reapply the modification on the original using
this information. Also, the Sobel filter assigns gradients in the image
such as that of the horizon as similar to edge-dense areas, resulting
in a map where some flat areas are not obscured. Furthermore, we
have shown that NIMA is not reliable when assessing the corrupting
quality of low-level noise such as FGSM perturbations. We believe
that aesthetic algorithms trained for low-level cues would improve
the efficacy of our coupled optimization approach.
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